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The rapid growth of China’s economic has provided huge development 
opportunity to many companies. Investment expansion is the only way for enterprises 
to grasp the market opportunities. But because of the complexity of decision process, 
the results of the investment decisions are not always maximize the enterprise value. 
Over-investment problem arises because of the principal-agent problem, which gives 
huge damage to the wealth of shareholders, also, the enterprise value. According to 
the managerial power approach, managers have the motivation to do opportunistic 
rent-seeking activities using their powers. Investment activities are the main way for 
enterprise expansion, and can bring higher wages, more controllable resources, higher 
reputation and more stable position to managers. Also, investment activities need 
managers’ discretion, which creates opportunities to rent-seeking. 
In requirement of research, this paper selects Chinese A-share listed companies 
from 2007 to 2012 as the study examples, and analyzes the relationship between 
managerial power and over-investment. Empirical results show that there is a 
significant effect from the managerial power to over-investment behavior. The 
expansion of managerial power aggravates the phenomenon of over-investment of the 
enterprise, which leads to the decrease of investment efficiency and the damage of the 
enterprise value. Higher efficiency of corporate governance and competition of 
external product market can exert effective restriction effect on managerial power. 
This article explores the underlying reason of the over-investment problem from the 
enterprise internal factors, and provides theoretical basis for improving the efficiency 
of enterprise investments based on the internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
external market governance mechanisms. 
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